This section conducts several robustness checks. We report results for an alternative calibration strategy that holds the level of technology fixed and report results using parameterizations of our model that are based on Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) and Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) . Our result that the NK model may exhibit orthodox and small fiscal multipliers at the zero bound continues to obtain when we use an alternative calibration scheme and consider other regions of the parameter space.
A.1 No-technology-shock calibration scheme
Most analyses of the zero bound that use the Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) Markov equilibrium also posit a single shock to demand. One advantage of that strategy is that employment is depressed in state L for the entire range of model parameters that we consider in the paper.
Our analysis focuses on parameterizations of the model that are empirically relevant in the sense that they all reproduce the GR declines in output and inflation. If we are to continue to reproduce these two facts with z L = z = 1, we will need to adjust another parameter instead.
We choose to adjust the Dixit-Stiglitz parameter, θ. Adjusting θ in conjunction with d L has no effect on the AD schedule because θ is not an argument of the AD schedule. Thus, the local properties of the AD schedule are the same as before. It is downward sloping when p is sufficiently low and rotates to right as p is increased eventually turning positive. However, θ enters slope(N KP C) and adjusting it in this way renders the AS schedule independent of p.
1
For our baseline parameterization of the model, slope(AS) = 0.036 using the no-technologyshock calibration scheme. This is about the same value of slope(AS) that occurs using the baseline calibration scheme with technology shocks for p ≈ 0.415.
2
The fact that the AS curve no longer varies with p has two main consequences. The first consequence is that the locus of p s where slope(AD) and slope(AS) become equal and then cross is shifted to the right. This modification enlarges the size of the Case I equilibrium region where the labor tax multiplier is unconventional. Comparing Figure 1 with Figure 4 in the paper we see that the Case I region starts at about the same value of p in both figures.
However, using this alternative calibration scheme the size of the Case I region extends to about p = 0.965. This in turn shrinks the size of the two indeterminacy regions (Case II and MZB) . The size of the Case III equilibrium regions is largely unaffected and it follows that there continues to be a large region where the LL solution yields the wrong slope of the AD 1 This calibration strategy implies that θ adjusts with pβd L in a way that keeps θ/(1 − pβd L ) constant. 2 For this value of p, the calibrated z L approximately equals z = 1.
schedule and thus produces an incorrect sign for the labor tax multiplier. This can be seen by comparing the upper panels of Figure 2 with the lower panels. In the upper panels that
show the NL solution we see a large red region where employment increases when the labor tax is cut. The LL solution, in contrast, is green in this region indicating a paradox of toil.
The second consequence is that the AS curve is now flatter at higher values of p and the fiscal multipliers are correspondingly smaller. For instance, using our baseline parameterization the fiscal multipliers are smaller using the no-technology shock calibration scheme in comparison to our baseline calibration scheme when 0.415 < p ≤ 0.863. This effect can be readily discerned for the labor tax multiplier by comparing the upper panel of Figure 5 with the upper panel of Figure 2 .
3 It is even more pronounced for the government purchase multiplier. For instance the yellow region with government purchase multipliers between 1.05 and 1.5 begins at p = 0.73 in the upper panel of Figure 6 (in the paper) for our baseline parameterization. In Figure 3 the yellow region does not begin until p reaches a value of 0.86.
In fact, the government purchase multiplier is less than 1.5 for all choices of p ≤ 0.95 using the no-technology-shock calibration scheme. It is only in the immediate neighborhood of the asymptote, which occurs at p ≈ 0.965, that the government purchase multiplier exceeds 1.5.
So far we have not said anything about the range of values taken on by θ. Higher values of p are associated with a smaller value of θ, and θ is declining in σ and γ. Some of the results reported in Figures 1-3 need θ < 1 to hit the GR targets. These these regions are reported in white. Even though we can compute equilibria with values of θ < 1 due to our subsidy scheme, θ in this range imply negative markups and are not of economic interest. To provide some indication about when this occurs suppose that γ is held fixed at its baseline value of 458.4 and σ = 1 then θ falls below 1 when p reaches 0.915. The associated values of the labor tax and government purchase multipliers are 0.56 and 1.1 respectively. But most estimates of θ are two or higher (see e.g. Broda and Weinstein (2004) ). If we use our baseline parameterization of the model and limit attention to values of θ ≥ 2, then p ≥ 0.84 are ruled out. Imposing this restriction implies that the government purchase GDP multiplier is 1.04 or less and that the labor tax multiplier is 0.17 or less.
In contrast to the calibration scheme with a technology shock, the no-technology-shock calibration scheme has the advantage that hours in state L are always below the steady-state.
However, that calibration scheme imposes a restriction on θ instead. A common feature of both calibration schemes is that it is impossible to find empirically relevant parameter values for if σ > 2 and p is large.
Overall, the general pattern of results that emerges using this calibration scheme is consis- Notes: Red: Case I (slope(AD)>0>slope(AS)); light Green: Case II (slope(AS)>slope(AD)>0); yellow: Case III (slope(AD)<0<slope(AS)); blue: Case MZB (multiple zero bound equilibria); dark Green: Case IV (slope(AD)>0>slope(AS)); white: θ < 1 tent with our previous results. We find large regions where LL solution produces an incorrect sign for the labor tax multiplier and the magnitudes of the multipliers are even smaller under this calibration scheme for many choices of p. Perhaps the biggest difference is that the size of the indeterminacy regions is much smaller now. This follows from the fact that a flatter AS schedule acts to push the asymptote as indexed by p to the right.
A.2 Accounting for the Great Recession with the parameterization of Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) find that the government purchase multiplier exceeds 2 in a nonlinear Rotemberg model that is very close to ours. 4 In our model this can also occur but only in the neighborhood of the point where slope(AD) = slope(AS). Moreover, in this neighborhood the sign and magnitudes of the fiscal multipliers are very sensitive to small perturbations of p and other structural parameters. It is thus interesting to investigate why their government purchase multipliers are so large.
Following their paper, we set the preference discount factor β = 0.99, the coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption to σ = 1 and the curvature parameter for leisure to Notes: Red: labor tax multiplier is negative (employment increases when the labor tax is cut); green: labor tax multiplier is in [0, 0.03]; yellow: labor tax multiplier is in (0.03, 1.0]; blue: labor tax multiplier exceeds one; white: θ < 1. The line denotes the baseline value of each parameter. ν = 1. The technology parameter θ that governs the substitutability of different types of goods is set to 3, the adjustment costs of price adjustment to γ = 100, and the conditional probability of exiting the low state to p = 0.775. The labor tax τ w is set to 0.2, the government purchases share in output η to 0.2, and the subsidy to intermediate goods producers τ s is set so that steady-state profits are zero. Finally, the coefficients on the Taylor rule are φ = 1.5
and φ y = 0. With this parameterization our loglinearized system is identical to the one in Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) .
5
We first examine whether some small differences in the nonlinear models are crucial for 5 One difference between the models is that Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) fix the level of government purchases as opposed to its share in output. However, the loglinearized systems are equivalent when one considers the same type of fiscal policy shock. Notes: Red: government-purchase-GDP-multiplier < 1; green: the multiplier is in [1, 1.05]; yellow: the multiplier is in [1.05, 1.5]; blue: the multiplier exceeds 1.5; white: θ < 1. The baseline parameterization is denoted with a line.
the differences in results, by solving our model using their parameter values. 6 In turns out the differences in the two models are inconsequential and we are able to reproduce the government purchase multipliers reported in Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) by setting d L = 1.0118.
The resulting government purchase multiplier for GDP is 2.2 using the NL solution and 2.8 using the LL solution method.
The reason their government purchase multipliers are so large is because the Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) parameterization has a very steep AS schedule. Their parameterization implies that slope(N KP C) is about 0.06 which is about three times larger than our 6 We assume that the resource costs of price adjustment apply to gross production (γπ 2 t y t ) whereas they assume that the resource costs of price adjustment only apply to GDP (γπ Christiano and Eichenbaum (2012) do not allow for technology shocks. So we also calibrate the model by adjusting θ and holding z fixed. This calibration scheme will also shift the asymptote to the right in the p dimension and it is possible that inferences about the size of the government purchase multiplier will be more robust. However, if we are to reproduce the GR facts using this calibration scheme we must also reduce slope(N KP C) and in order to make the AS schedule flatter. We achieve this by lowering the value of θ to 1.24 and also increasing γ to 300. The reason why we have to adjust both of these parameters is because if we try to recalibrate their model by adjusting d L and θ only, the resulting value of θ is less than 1 and thus not economically meaningful.
7 Their parameterization implies slope(N KP C) = 0.06 when the share of government purchases in output is held fixed. If instead the level of government purchases is held fixed as they assume, slope(N KP C) is 0.0675.
8 This result also occurs if we set d L to produce a 7% decline in output using the NL equilibrium conditions. Figures 8-10 report results using the no-technology-shock calibration scheme. We saw above that the no-technology shock calibration scheme resulted in lower fiscal multipliers
for larger values of p because slope(AS) is independent of p. 9 This is also true here. For instance, the equilibrium is now determinate and of type Case II and the government purchase multiplier is 1.06 when (σ = 1, θ = 1.24, γ = 300, p = 0.775). In fact, the government purchase multiplier only exceeds 1.5 when p ∈ [0.94, 0.965] but in that area, θ < 1. (8).
The no-technology-shock results have several other noteworthy features. Now Case MZB equilibria occur at higher values of σ even when p is small and far away from the asymptote.
The targeted zero bound equilibrium in this region continues to have slope(AD) < 0 and slope(AS) > 0 and it follows that the labor tax multiplier has an orthodox sign in this entire region ( Figure 9 ). In the non-target equilibrium inflation and output exceed their steadystate levels but it is still a ZLB equilibrium because d L is large. Note also that the overall size of the region with a downward-sloping AD schedule is smaller in Figure 8 as compared to our baseline calibration without technology shocks reported in the left panel of Figure 1 . This is because the value of γ = 300 is lower than our baseline value of 458.4. The pattern of equilibria when γ is varied is qualitatively similar in the right panels of Figures 1 and 8.
Most of the results with γ < 300 are not economically meaningful because the associated A.3 Accounting for the Great Recession with the parameterization of Denes, Eggertsson and Gilbukh (2013) We now consider the parameterization of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) . Their estimated parameterization is interesting because their estimates imply a much smaller value of slope(N KP C) = 0.0075 than we have considered up to this point. Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) consider a NK framework with Calvo price adjustment and firm specific labor markets and a single shock to d L . This is a different model from ours and the results that follow should not be interpreted as saying anything about their structural model. The common link between their model and ours is that they solve their model using the LL solution method we described in the paper and the loglinearized reduced form of their model and is identical to ours. They estimate their model parameters using an overidentified Quasi-Bayesian method of moments procedure with two moments that they associate with the GR: an output decline of 10% and an (annualized) decline in the inflation rate of -2%. The resulting estimates are: (p, θ, β, σ, ν) = (0.857, 13.23, 0.997, 1.22, 1.69). Finally, their fiscal parameters are set in the same way that we have assumed up to now.
We are interested in understanding the properties of our model in this region of the parameter space. However, in order to do that we must first make some small adjustments to their estimates. Our practice has been to calibrate the model using our nonlinear equilibrium conditions. Here we adjust d L and γ to reproduce our GR inflation and output targets using our NL equilibrium conditions. 10 The resulting value of γ = 6341. These adjustments have only a very small effect on slope(N KP C). It rises from 0.0075 using the estimated parameterization of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) to 0.0086 using our calibrated Why is γ so large for this parameterization? Our discussion in Section 4.1 and 4.2 of the paper implies that slope(N KP C) must be small to produce a Case 1 equilibrium when p is large. Indeed, the value of slope(N KP C) here is less than half the size implied by our baseline calibration. To understand why γ is large observe that the Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) estimates of the other parameters in slope(N KP C) including θ, σ, and ν are all much higher than our estimates. The fact that these other parameters are so large implies that γ must also be very large if slope(N KP C) is to be small enough to reproduce the GR targets at high values of p, see also Appendix . The most noteworthy new property of the model is shown in Figure 11 . 11 The Case III region is now much smaller and instead there is a very large Case MZB region at low values of p. The size of this region increases with σ and γ. Throughout this region there are two zero bound equilibria, the targeted equilibrium has slope(AD) < 0 < slope(AS) and the second has 0 < slope(AD) < slope(AS).
The model has a unique Case III equilibrium at the reference value of p = 0.857, estimated by Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) . This implies that employment increases in response to a cut in the labor tax (Figure 12 ). Using the LL solution one would conclude instead that there is a paradox of toil and that it is large (0.11).
The size of the government purchase multiplier using the NL equilibrium conditions is 1.08 at the reference parameterization and with marginally higher σ it would fall below 1.05 ( Figure 13 ). There are some larger differences between the NL and LL government purchase multipliers here. The LL solution produces larger government purchase multipliers at lower values of p. However, once again we see that a government purchase multiplier in excess of 1.5 only occurs in a very small region of the parameter space as indexed by p, σ and γ.
To summarize, the results we have reported here are consistent with the message of our
paper. The NK model may also exhibit orthodox and small fiscal multipliers at the zero 
Appendix B Calvo model with a single labor market
This section presents the equilibrium conditions in the Calvo model with a single labor market. They are given by
(1 + π t+1 ) θ as 2,t+1 ], P t = as 2,t as 1,t , whereP t is the real price which is chosen by firms that can change their nominal prices at time t, x t summarizes the relative price dispersion, and α is the probability that a firm is unable to change its price. The term 1/x t introduces the wedge between GDP (y t ) and gross output (z t h t ), and 1 − 1/x t acts as κ t in our baseline Rotemberg model. In NK models with Calvo price setting, there is a non-degenerate relative price distribution and as a result the allocation of the factors of production (labor in this model) is inefficient, i.e. higher price dispersion reduces GDP compared to the maximal production level that is possible with the same level of factor input. Notes: Red: government-purchase-GDP-multiplier < 1; green: the multiplier is in [1, 1.05]; yellow: the multiplier is in [1.05, 1.5]; blue: the multiplier exceeds 1.5; white: θ < 1. The baseline parameterization is denoted with a line.
assumption: x is constant at x L when the shocks are (d L , z L ) and becomes 1 immediately after the shocks dissipate. This allows us to use the AD and the AS schedules to characterize a zero bound equilibrium.
Once the shocks dissipate, all variables jump to the zero inflation steady-state, where
In the L state, by assumption, x L can be written as The AS schedule is a little bit more complicated. First observẽ
Then using
we obtain
the AS schedule is characterized by 
Appendix C Existence of a zero bound equilibrium in the LL model
To make the argument more transparent we assume thatη L =τ L w = 0.
Proposition 1 Existence of a zero bound equilibrium in the LL model. Supposê do not coincide in state L. Then there exists a unique zero bound equilibrium with deflation
If the parameters do not satisfy either both 1a) and 1b) or alternatively both 2a) and 2b), then there is no zero bound equilibrium with depressed labor inputĥ L < 0.
13
13 The final statement leaves open the possibility that a zero bound equilibrium withĥ L ≥ 0 exists for parameterizations that satisfy 1a) and 2b) (or 1b) and 2a)). This is possible when z L is sufficiently low. If it is assumed thatẑ L = 0, then the final clause can be removed and any ZLB equilibrium must satisfy both (1a) and (1b) or both (2a) and (2b). For further details see Braun, Körber, and Waki (2012) .
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Proof The AD and the AS schedules are
They are upward-sloping, for both slope(AD) and slope(AS) are positive.
First, assume (1a) and (1b). They imply that the AD schedule is strictly steeper than the AS schedule, and that the intercept term is strictly higher for the AD schedule than for the AS schedule. It follows that at the intersectionĥ
Since slope(AS) − slope(AD) < 0, π L is negative at the intersection if and only if the terms in the square brackets are positive.
Thus, at the intersection of the AD and the AS schedules, (π L ,ĥ L ) < (0, 0).
What remains to show is that at the intersection, the Taylor rule implies zero nominal interest rate. The linear part of the Taylor rule prescribeŝ rate at the intersection is zero.
Next, assume (2a) and (2b). Proof is almost the same as that in the case with (1a) and (1b). The only difference is that φ π needs to be sufficiently large to haver
Since the AD schedule is upward sloping andĥ L < 0, π L is smaller than the intercept of the
The nominal interest rate is thus zero.
Finally, suppose 1a) holds but 1b) doesn't. Then the AD is no steeper than the AS, and the intercept of the AD is larger than the intercept of the AS. When the AD and the AS are parallel but their intercepts differ, then there is no intersection and thus no equilibrium with R = 0. When the AS is strictly steeper than the AD, then their intersection satisfiesĥ
and there is no ZLB equilibrium withĥ L ≤ 0.
The same argument goes through for the case where 2a) holds but 2b) doesn't.
Appendix D Loglinearization of the AD and the AS schedules using the L state as a reference point and formulas for multipliers
D.1 Loglinearization of the AD and the AS schedules
When computing multipliers it is sometimes convenient to loglinearize the AD and AS sched-
and
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Loglinearizing the AS equation yields:
Loglinearizing the aggregate resource constraint
D.2 Multiplier formulas
Labor tax multiplier Our multiplier measures are based on the above system that is loglinearized around a zero bound equilibrium. Note that ∆h = icept(AS) − icept(AD) slope(AD) − slope(AS) , and ∆π = slope(AD)∆h + icept(AD) = slope(AS)∆h + icept(AS).
The labor tax multiplier on hours is thus
And the multiplier on inflation is:
These multipliers are the marginal ones, for they are derived from elasticities.
Clearly, the slopes of the AD and the AS schedules are crucial for the multipliers. The sign of the multiplier on hours is positive when the relative slope, slope(AD)/slope(AS), is bigger than one, and negative when it is less than one. Therefore, whenever the AD and the AS schedules have different signs, the multiplier on hours is negative. The multiplier is positive only when both schedules have the same signed slopes and the AD schedule is steeper. The absolute size of the multiplier explodes as the two schedules' slopes become closer.
Government purchase multiplier
To calculate the government purchases multiplier, it is convenient to start by deriving the multipliers associated with perturbations in the share of government purchases in output: 
We can then calculate the multipliers associated with perturbations in the level of government purchases as follows Government purchases hours multiplier :
Government purchases GDP multiplier :
Note that the government purchases increase with η when ∂∆g/∂∆η is positive. In such a case, the sign of the consumption response determines whether the government purchase multiplier on GDP is bigger than or less than one. Because the Euler equation implies that consumption and inflation are positively related when the nominal rate is constant, it suffices to know whether the inflation response is positive or not. What determines its sign and size
If the AD schedule is upward-sloping, the inflation response is positive when the AS schedule is also upward-sloping but flatter than the AD schedule. If both schedules are upward-sloping and the AS schedule is steeper, then the inflation response is negative. If the AD schedule is instead downward-sloping, the inflation response is positive either (i) when the AS schedule is upward-sloping, or (ii) when the AS schedule is downward-sloping and steeper than the AD schedule. 
Effects of a technology shock
Observe, that output increases and hours and inflation fall in response to an improvement in technology when σ = 1 in a Case III equilibrium since slope(AD) < 0 < slope(AS). In a Case II equilibrium we have (0 < slope(AD) < slope(AS)) and it follows that an improvement in technology increases employment, output and the inflation rate when σ = 1.
Appendix E Loglinear Slope of New Keynesian Phillips Curve
This section provides a more detailed analysis on the restrictions imposed by the calibration target.
Denote the slope coefficient (on output) in the loglinear New Keynesian Phillips curve by
. Then the AS schedule can be written as
This relationship holds not only for our model but also for a wide range of NK models including those with Calvo price setting. Importantly, slope(N KP C) is independent of Under the stated assumptions, Table 1: To put these numbers in perspective, consider values of the Calvo parameter implied by these values of slope(N KP C). In the NK model with Calvo price setting and a homogeneous labor market, slope(N KP C) is given by the formula
where α is the Calvo parameter. If (σ, ν) = (1, 1) and β ≈ 1, the right hand side equals 0.01 when the Calvo parameter α is as high as 0.93, and equals 0.02 when α is around 0.905.
If (σ, ν) = (1, 0.28) and β ≈ 1 as in our baseline specification, the right hand side equals 0.01 when α is around 0.916, and equals 0.02 when α is around 0.883. 14 Intuitively, the GR target inflation rate is so much lower than the target output decline that the New Keynesian Phillips Curve has to be very flat in order to be consistent with the target.
Note that the arguments so far are conditional onẑ L = 0. Deep recessions may bring about some production efficiency loss through e.g. resource misallocation, and/or lower utilization rates for production factors. Whenẑ L < 0 is allowed, the AS schedule is
Note that we rewrite it withŷ L =ĥ L +ẑ L . This is because we are fixing the target values for inflation rate and GDP, and with a technology shock GDP and labor input are different.
Restrictions imposed by the calibration targets are most transparently seen when labor input
This leads to the following expression It is worth mentioning that the above discussion does not use any information about the AD schedule, and hence these results also obtain in the true nonlinear model as long as loglinearization methods approximates the AS schedule well.
Next, we point out that when p is close to one an asymptote or a Case 1 equilibrium is only possible if slope(N KP C) is very small. To understand this, observe that slope(AD) slope(AS) can be written as
When the left hand side is larger (smaller) than the right hand side, the AD schedule is steeper (flatter) than the AS schedule.
This relationship has several implications. First, let p be the value of p which satisfies the above with equality. When p → p, slope(AD)/slope(AS) → 1 and the denominators in the multiplier formulas go to zero as well. This results in an asymptote with very large positive or negative fiscal multipliers on each side of it. Second, since the left hand side of this inequality is decreasing in p, if we want to entertain very high p and slope(AD) > slope(AS), then the right hand side slope(N KP C)/σ must be sufficiently low. For example, when β ≈ 1 and p = 0.9, the left hand side is approximately 0.0111. When σ = 1, then slope(N KP C) < 0.0111 must hold. This restriction is not very tight for modestly large p: e.g. for p = 0.8 and β ≈ 1, the left hand side is around 0.05, and when σ = 1, the requirement is slope(N KP C) < 0.05.
The shocks to demand and technology are assumed to follow AR 1 rules:
where the shocks are assumed to be Gaussian with zero means and variance-covariance matrix
We estimated the model using version 4.3.3 of Dynare. When computing the posteriors, we specified Metropolis Hastings chains of length 60,000 and used 10 parallel chains. After some experimentation we set the scale of the jumping distribution for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to 0.68 which produced an acceptance ratio that ranged from 0.2-0.3. The other DYNARE options for Metropolis Hastings were set at their default values.
Priors, posterior modes, posterior means and 5 and 95 percentiles for all estimated parameters are reported in Table 2 .
Appendix G Calibration
For our baseline exercises, we fix (β, σ, ν, θ, γ) at their estimated/calibrated values. For given p, we adjust (d L , z L ) to hit the inflation and output targets (π L , gdp L ). The level of technology in the high state (H) normalized to 1, and thus the steady-state values of all prices and allocations are known. We also know the value of consumption in the L state
For a given p, we can solve the AD equation for d L :
We then solve the AS equation for z L : Notes: Light gray: employment is below its steady-state value; dark gray: employment exceeds its steady-state value. The line denotes the baseline value of each parameter.
Note that all variables in this second equation are known except for z L .
When considering the specification with constant technology, we restrict z L = 1 , we vary θ to hit the target. This proceeds in the following way. The preference shock d L is calibrated first in the same way as before. This step does not require knowledge of θ. Then we use the second equation which is derived from the AS equation, to solve for θ. When calibrating our model to the parameterization of Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) , we restrict z L = 1
and fix θ at their estimated value of this parameter, and then adjust d L and γ instead to satisfy the above two equations.
Appendix H Employment at the zero bound
We have calibrated the model to produce a 7% decline in GDP. The resource costs of price adjustment, however, drive a wedge between GDP and employment and it is possible in some situations for employment in state L to exceed its steady-state level even though GDP is below its steady-state level. Figure 15 displays when this occurs. The reason this occurs is that technology in this situations is very depressed. If instead technology is held fixed as described in Section A, employment is always depressed at the zero bound. 
